Edvard Benes was born as the youngest son into a peasant family living in the district of Rakovnik. After his studies at Prague Vinohrady Gymnasium in the years 1896-1904 he enrolled to the Faculty of Philosophy in Prague. After studying briefly he left for Paris, where he studied at the Sorbonne and at the Independent School of Political and Social Studies. Except for his short stay in London he stayed in France until 1907 when he moved to Berlin. By receiving his Doctorate of Laws he completed his university studies firstly in Dijon (1908) by receiving Doctorate of Laws, and one year later by passing rigorous exams in Prague. He taught for three years at the Prague Academy of Commerce, and later on he came to lecture sociology at Charles University as private associate professor.
The outbreak of the World War I provoked Benes into organising an internal resistance movement called "Maffia". In particular he was responsible for channels of communication between Prague and future President Masaryk, who was exiled in Switzerland at the time. In September 1915 Benes left for abroad and from that time on his destiny was closely tied to personalities of T.G. Masaryk a M.R. Stefanik. Benes then lived in Paris where he also organized and managed individual sections of foreign emigration as well as contributed to promotion of Czechoslovak political programme. He reorganised the courier service, which maintained the covert links between him and "Maffia" in Czech lands. Aside from diplomatic efforts to gain political prestige in the eyes of foreign resistance movements he was giving a cycle of lectures at the Sorbonne in Paris on the subject of Slavicism, and wrote a series of articles for French and Czech foreign newspapers. He was instrumental in establishing the Czechoslovak National Council (1916), where he was bestowed with the function of the General Secretary. Together with M.R. Stefanik, he negotiated with the representatives of consensual powers in order to establish independent Czechoslovak military units. Subsequently, after obtaining consent as well as support the first legions were created in France (December 1917), Russia (summer 1918) and in Italy (April 1918). The outstanding result of Benes diplomatic efforts led to the recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council as the representative of the new Czechoslovak State by France (June 1918), England (August 1918) and Italy (October 1918). This also enabled representatives of the Czechoslovak National Council to be admitted to the collective talks of the states of the Treaty of Versailles.
On October 28, 1918 Benes acting as the representative of the foreign resistance negotiated with domestic politicians in Geneva on the future of the newly independent Czechoslovak state, and upon reaching an agreement Benes became the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of the newly formed Czechoslovakia. However, he did not return home until September 1919, for already in November 1918 he had to go to Paris in order to secure the previously non-existent southern Slovak border, and to extricate Slovakia from Hungary, as well as to procure the recognition of the historical borders of the Czech State. At that time, Czechoslovakia emerged in a new state form never existing before, on the basis of Woodrow Wilsons principle of nations rights for self-determination, which was, however, acknowledged only to the purposefully defined Czechoslovak nation in the new state. This concept, accepted to this date by most of the Czech nationals as natural and just, Benes vindicated in Peace Convents of 1919 and 1920, and as a creator of the Czechoslovak foreign politics he endeavoured to secure it by international pacts.
Edvard Benes was present at the inception of the League of Nations, and as its deputy chairman (1920), member of the Board (in 1923-27) and member of the Security Council, and its chairman (1935) he supported the principle of collective security. In 1920-22, Benes founded the Little Alliance with Yugoslavia and Romania, and in 1924, he negotiated an alliance treaty with the post-war European power, the France. He was a renowned person at important international boutiques conferences (e.g. in Genoa 1922, Locarno 1925, the Hague 1930, and Lausanne 1932) and had profound knowledge and understanding of international politics and relations. Although his primary domain was foreign affairs, he also played an important role in internal matters.
From the inception of the State, Edvard Benes was Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in the years 1919 to 1926 and 1929 to 1935, he was en elected member of the National Assembly, including Prime Minister in the years 1921 to 1922. Following president T.G. Masaryks abdication, Benes became President of the Czechoslovak Republic on December 18, 1935. As the vice chairman of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party (Benes was its member in 1923 to 1935), he had a profound influence over its policies. He rejected Marxism, but adhered to socialist ideas, the "overall development towards agricultural and workers democratism as well as natural and unavoidable weakening of the municipal bourgeoisie influence" he considered as one of the important results of the World War I. His opinions disallowed him to fully understand totalitarian principle of the Bolshevism, although he disagreed with it. In his endeavour to firmly anchor the security of the State, he tried to abolish the international isolation of the U.S.S.R. and to bring it into the League of Nations. When this was successfully accomplished, he closed an Alliance Treaty with the U.S.S.R. (in 1935). Shortly after that Munich treaty took place in 1938.
It will remain the eternal theme of the Czech history, whether it would be back then better to fight in international isolation than the moral marasmus after capitulation. It is certain that Slovaks longed for autonomy, Hungarians and Germans for alliance with their nations, and Czechs did not compel war from their political representatives including Benes. He abdicated on October 5, 1938, and went to exile. After war occupation of the Czech Lands and establishment of the Slovak State in March 1939 Benes proclaimed Munich treaty as invalid and held the theory of legal continuity of the Czechoslovakia. During the World War II Benes reached acknowledgement of the Czechoslovak exile government by all allied countries.
The Munich treaty meant trauma to Benes the same as to his Czech fellow citizens, and he was literally possessed to rectify it. Already after the events in Munich Benes occupied his mind with the problem of Germans in Czech Lands, and with future foreign-politics orientation, and for his conclusions he was able to win not only politicians of his generation - for example J. Sramek or J. Stransky - but also younger politics: H. Ripka, P. Drtina and others. Benes came to a conclusion, supported from his homeland, that a war is an apt historical moment to solve problems of the State by expulsion of Germans. Far before the Postdam Conference he communicated that end of the war"in our country must mean a great peoples vengeance and a really bloody and unmerciful end for Germans" (February 1944).
During the war Benes came to understanding of how the powers will be distributed in post-war Central Europe, which led him to sign treaty with the Soviet Union in December 1943, in despite of initial disagreement of the Brits. He appealed to his countrymen to view his trip to Moscow "in the spirit of our entire national history of the past centuries". He did not event oppose to the significant changes in domestic policy. Besides the Czechoslovak Communist Party he was willing to allow socialist parties and the leftist bourgeoisie parties into the political system, and intended to implement very radical social and economic changes in the country. This was on the agenda of his visit to Moscow in December 1943, and was discussed with the foreign leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. It was also from Moscow that he would return to a liberated homeland.
After his triumphant arrival in Prague on May 16, 1945, Benes began taking steps to realising his intention to "unite the national revolution with the economic revolution" by his Decree. He was reinstated to his political office on October 28, 1945 and re-elected president on June 19, 1946. To much he stemmed from the thought that the Czechoslovakia may become "a bridge" between the Soviet Union and Western democratic countries, and thus help maintain stability in Europe. As a sociologist, he was convinced that politics are "practical sociology" and that his policies were based in science. However, further development has shown that the ideas behind his policies stemmed from wishes, not from science. Benes faith in democratisation of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party was defeated by dramatic events in February 1948. Shortly thereafter, on June 7, 1948, Benes abdicated and died soon. (mch, ss)
Edvard Beneš, (born May 28, 1884, Kozlany, Bohemia, Austria-Hungary [now in Czech Republic]—died September 3, 1948, Sezimovo Ústí, Czechoslovakia [now in Czech Republic]), statesman, foreign minister, and president, a founder of modern Czechoslovakia who forged its Western-oriented foreign policy between World Wars I and II but capitulated to Adolf Hitler's demands during the Czech crisis of 1938.
After studying in Prague, Paris, and Dijon, France, Beneš received a doctorate of laws in 1908 and taught at the Prague Commercial Academy and the Czech University of Prague (now Charles University) before World War I. Influenced by the nationalist ideas of Tomáš Masaryk, who wished to liberate the Czechs and Slovaks from Austrian rule, Beneš followed his mentor to Switzerland during World War I and then established himself in Paris. With Masaryk and the Slovak leader Milan Štefánik, Beneš formed a propaganda organization that eventually became a Czechoslovak provisional government on October 14, 1918. With the collapse of Austria-Hungary in November 1918, a new Czechoslovak state was quickly formed. As foreign minister, a post he was to retain until 1935, Beneš headed his country's delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and championed the League of Nations throughout the interwar period, serving as its Council chairman six times. Opposed to plans for union between Austria and Germany (after World War I and again in 1931), which he deemed a threat to Czechoslovakia's continued existence, he attempted to reestablish a balance of power in eastern Europe. To fill the partial power vacuum created by the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, Beneš negotiated the treaties with Romania and Yugoslavia (1921) that formed the Little Entente, originally aimed at revisionist Hungary. France joined in 1924, and thereafter the alliance became a bloc against Germany and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union. In 1935, however, he signed a mutual assistance pact between his country and the Soviet Union.
With the resignation of Masaryk as president in 1935, Beneš was elected to that office. Relations with Poland and Germany, never amicable, steadily worsened. Though he granted substantially the first Sudetenland German autonomy demands in 1938, he was nevertheless unable to avert the crisis that led to the destruction of the Czechoslovak state. Abandoned by his allies, Beneš capitulated before the German ultimatum, and his country lost the Sudetenland in September 1938. Poland soon occupied the disputed Teschen area. Resigning on October 5, 1938, Beneš went into exile. After the outbreak of World War II he established in France a Czechoslovak national committee, which moved to London in 1940. Reestablishing a government on his native soil on April 3, 1945, Beneš entered Prague on May 16 to the enthusiastic welcome of the population. His was the only eastern European exile government to be allowed to return after the war.
Backlash against the ethnic German and Hungarian populations in postwar Czechoslovakia was swift and brutal. Beginning in 1945, the so-called “Beneš decrees” (officially the Decrees of the President of the Republic) were enacted, stripping the citizenship of millions of Sudeten Germans and tens of thousands of Hungarians unless they could prove their wartime loyalty to the Czechoslovak state. Their property was confiscated without compensation, and as many as 19,000 “expellees” were killed during their forced expulsion from Czechoslovakia. The Beneš decrees continued to be a contentious point into the 21st century, but they remained in force, precluding any claim to reparations by those dispossessed in the 1940s.
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Beneš realized that Czechoslovakia had to cooperate closely with the Soviet Union. Increasingly ill, he suffered two strokes in 1947. When his communist prime minister, Klement Gottwald, demanded on February 25, 1948, that Beneš accept a communist-dominated cabinet, Beneš again had no choice but to capitulate. Refusing to sign the new constitution, he resigned on June 7, 1948. Having witnessed the apparent suicide of his lifelong friend Jan Masaryk (son of Tomáš Masaryk) a few months earlier, Beneš died a broken man in 1948. His unfinished Memoirs: From Munich to New War and New Victory appeared in English in 1954.
The youngest son of 10 children, Eduard (he would change the spelling of his first name when he was attending university) was born May 28, 1884 in Kožlany, Bohemia, about 60 kilometers from Prague. His brother Vojta also took up politics. The future statesman spent his childhood years in Prague's Vinohrady district. After graduating from the Philosophical Faculty of Charles University, he went abroad with a two-year tenure in Paris and another year in Berlin. In Paris Beneš studied at the Sorbonne and the Independent School of Political and Social Studies. He earned his doctorate in Dijon, France, where he focused on the political struggles of Slavonic nations in Austria. Back in Prague, Beneš received another doctorate. After completing his studies, he taught at a business school and at university.
Beneš and the struggle for Czechoslovak independence
Convinced that Czechs and Slovaks shared the same ethnic identity, Beneš was very active in the struggle for Czechoslovak independence during World War I. He coordinated the anti-Austrian resistance group Maffia and set up a home base in Paris during September of 1915, where along with future president Tomáš G. Masaryk and one of the major players in the resistance government, Slovak Milan Rastislav Štefánik, he tried to gain support for an independent Czechoslovakia. The Czech resistance leader was also responsible for coordinating legions that fought for the West in France, Russia and Italy.
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Beneš as Minister of Foreign Affairs
When Czechoslovakia was born in 1918, Beneš became Minister of Foreign Affairs. The experienced diplomat served as Prime Minister from 1921-22, when he built up a defensive system against Austro-Hungary, called the Little Entente, with Romania and Yugoslavia, and he also paved the way for the Czechoslovak French Treaty of 1924. A representative in Parliament from 1919-26 and 1929-35, Beneš was a member of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, as of 1926 the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, which was not affiliated with the Nazi German National Socialist Workers' Party. Established in 1898, the Czechoslovak Socialist Party aspired to gain independence from Austro-Hungary and asserted that democracy and morality were conditions of socialism. In 1935 the treaty he signed with the Soviet Union stated that the USSR would aid Czechoslovakia in war time if France also came to the country's assistance.
Slovak unrest
The second half of the 1930s was a period fraught with complaints from the German and Slovak minorities who demanded more rights and freedom. For example, during May of 1935 the fascist and nationalistic Hlinka's Slovak People's Party tried to pressure the dedicated diplomat to make Slovak the official language of Slovakia and to provide them with a legislative diet in Bratislava, among other demands. Beneš stood firm, asserting that only a united Czechoslovak nation could survive the threats caused by the Nazi and fascist regimes in neighboring countries.
Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš
Beneš succeeded Masaryk as president in December of 1935. The Sudeten Germans – ethnic Germans living in the Czech lands – and Slovaks continued to assert more and more pressure. In 1938 Beneš recognized Slovakia as an independent nation. During April of that same year, the Sudeten German question came to a head when the German minority issued the Carlsbad demands, which included rights such as full equality with the Czechs, complete self-government and freedom to express Nazi ideology. At first Beneš stood his ground, but he finally did agree to the demands that September. Beneš also engineered a „Third Plan,“ which involved setting up 20 or more small districts where Germans would have much autonomy if they proved to be the majority in those areas. Surrendering to the demands of the Germans and Slovaks triggered much disapproval in the government. Convinced the Munich Agreement that ceded the Sudetenland to the Third Reich was unjust, Beneš resigned October 5, 1938.
Resistance activities during the Nazi Occupation
During 1938 he found himself abroad once more. When Britain and France joined the war against Germany in October of 1939, he established a government-in-exile in London, and Britain acknowledged it during 1940. The Soviet Union followed in 1941. Beneš and Czechoslovak military intelligence officer and resistance leader František Moravec contributed to the plan formed in England by the Czechoslovak army-in-exile that aspired to assassinate high-ranking Nazi official Reinhard Heydrich with Operation Anthropoid. The successful plan brought about brutal reprisals, though. More than 13,000 people were arrested, and about 5,000 were killed in reprisals. The villages of Lidice and Ležáky were razed. In Lidice 199 men were murdered, 95 children (most of whom would be gassed) were taken away from their parents, eight children were given to German families and 195 women were sent to a concentration camp. All the men in Ležáky were executed.
Leanings toward Russia
During the first three years of the war, Beneš sought to set up a federation between the Czechoslovaks and Poles, but due to pressure from Moscow, it did not become a reality. He did, though, sign treaties with Great Britain and France. The Czechoslovak statesman with leanings toward Russia went to Moscow to meet with Stalin and signed a new treaty with the USSR during 1943, feeling assured that the West would become more socialist after the war and the USSR would have a more western orientation.
Beneš' second term as president and the Beneš decrees
Beneš returned to Czechoslovakia in 1945 and was elected President of the second republic in June of 1946. Arguing that the Sudeten Germans were collectively responsible for the destruction of independent Czechoslovakia, he put into effect the Beneš decrees, confiscating the property of Germans, traitors and collaborators in the country, stripping them of their citizenship and even expelling them from the nation. The controversial decrees are still in effect.
Communism and February 25, 1948
Communists became major players in the new government as they controlled the most important ministries. Communist Klement Gottwald became Prime Minister during 1947. On February 20, 1948 the Communists asserted much pressure by forming a people's militia of 15,000 members. That day the 12 noncommunist ministers resigned, convinced that Beneš would establish a new government without the Communist Party. However, Beneš made no attempt to mobilize the fierce opposition against the Communists because he thought the USSR should play a major role in central Europe and was afraid that Germany would become powerful again. Beneš was convinced that Soviet socialism would be moderate and European while he predicted that European capitalism would lean more toward socialism.
It was Benes' hesitation in February of 1948 that allowed the Communists to take over the government and make Czechoslovakia into a totalitarian state. Surrendering to the Communist threat, he appointed a Communist majority government February 25, 1948. Refusing to sign the new pro-Communist constitution, Beneš abdicated June 7 of that year, and Klement Gottwald became the new president.
The death of a prominent statesman
Three months later Beneš died. Stricken by spinal tuberculosis and other illnesses, the prominent Czechoslovak statesman passed away September 3, 1948 at his villa in Sezimovo Ústí, where he is buried alongside his wife.
Beneš' writing legacy
Beneš was an avid writer advocating democracy as well as a politician. His memoirs and speeches make up a few of the many books he published. His works printed in English translation are Bohemia's Case for Independence from 1917, his My War Memoirs from 1928 and Democracy Today and Tomorrow from 1939.
The controversial Edvard Beneš
Edvard Beneš is a name that triggers much controversy: some people consider him a phenomenal politician dedicated to democracy while others sneer at him, pinpointing the tragedies of his political career. Beneš did make great achievements in his resistance work during both wars and was responsible for some ground-breaking events as foreign minister and president. Along with Masaryk he put Czech politics on the European and world map. Yet he was trapped in a tragic drama of international relations. He made mistakes. He put too much faith in the USSR and Russian socialism, for example. He hesitated when he should have taken action during February of 1948. Both his achievements and tragedies have to be considered within the historical context of the times as he was not once but twice defeated by ideological parties that destroyed democracy in Czechoslovakia.
(b. 28 May 1884, d. 3 Sept. 1948).
President of Czechoslovakia 1935–8, 1945–8. Born in Kozlány (Bohemia), he was educated in Prague and at the Sorbonne (Paris), and became a lecturer in economics at Prague University before World War I. In 1914 he fled from Prague to Paris, where he helped Masaryk to form the Czechoslovak National Council. He became the leader of the Czech National Socialist Party, and was Czech delegate at the Paris Peace Conference. As Foreign Minister (1918–35) he sought to stabilize the young state through international treaties. The Little Entente was created in 1921 to prevent the restoration of the Habsburg King Charles in Hungary. The Czechoslovak–French treaty of 1924 was designed to guarantee the countrys independence. As one‐time Prime Minister (1921–2), and one of Masaryks closest allies, he was the natural successor to the presidency following Masaryks resignation. A pragmatist as well as a nationalist, he grudgingly accepted Slovak demands for recognition of their distinctiveness, and was even prepared to surrender the Sudetenland in return for peace with Germany. Ultimately, however, he resigned in solidarity with the entire Cabinet over the Munich Agreement.
Beneš went into exile and taught in the USA until the outbreak of war, when he became head of the Czechoslovak government‐in‐exile in 1939, first in Paris, and then in London. He had no ideological prejudices against Stalin, and believed that after the war there would be a ‘convergence', whereby the USSR would become more capitalist, and Western Europe more socialist. This explains his willingness to accept the growing power of the Czechoslovak Communist Party under Gottwald in his postwar government, and his failure to mobilize opposition against the Communist takeover of the state in February 1948. Indeed, he agreed to stay on as President, resigning only on 6 May 1948.
ww2dbaseEdvard Beneš was born in Kožlany, Bohemia, at the time a province of Austria-Hungary. In 1912, he taught at the Charles University of Prague, and from 1916 to 1918 he was a Secretary of the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris and Minister of the Interior and of Foreign Affairs of the province. His political ideal saw the Czechs and Slovaks working together for a common Czechoslovakia, and with this vision he was a strong organizer of Czechoslovakians abroad. Between 1918 and 1935, he was the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, and from 1920 to 1925 and again from 1929 to 1935 he was a member of the Parliament. Between 1935 and 1938, he was the President of Czechoslovakia, but resigned from office on 5 Oct 1938 as his personal protest against German aggression and western appeasement. Emigrating to Britain, immediately outside of London, he headed the Czechoslovakian government-in-exile as president. In Britain, he organized various movements against German occupation of his home country, one of which culminated in the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich. After the war ended, he returned to Czechoslovakia and resumed his role as the president of the nation, with a new policy to eventually deport ethnic Germans to Germany and Austria. On 7 Jun 1948, he resigned once again, this time due to the communist takeover several months before; Prime Minister Klement Gottwald, the head of the communist movement, succeeded him as the next president. Beneš died at his villa in Sezimovo Ústí, Czechoslovakia.
Edvard Beneš, sometimes anglicised to Edward Benesh (Czech pronunciation: [ˈɛdvard ˈbɛnɛʃ] (About this soundlisten); 28 May 1884 – 3 September 1948), was a Czech politician and statesman who was President of Czechoslovakia from 1935 to 1938 and again from 1945 to 1948. He also led the Czechoslovak government-in-exile 1939 to 1945, during World War II. As President, Beneš faced two major crises which both resulted in his resignation.
His first resignation came after the Munich Agreement and subsequent German occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1938, which brought his government into exile in the United Kingdom. The second came about with the 1948 communist coup, which created a communist regime. Before his time as President, Beneš was also the first Minister of Foreign Affairs (1918–1935) and the fourth Prime Minister (1921–1922) of Czechoslovakia. A member of the Czechoslovak National Social Party, he was known as a skilled diplomat.[1]
Contents
1Early life
1.1Birth and family
1.2Education and marriage
2Political career before independence
3Foreign minister
4First presidency
4.1Sudeten Crisis
5Wartime exile in Britain
5.1Organizing the government-in-exile
5.2Operation Barbarossa begins
5.3Working with the Czech resistance
5.4Britain rejects the Munich Agreement
6Second presidency
6.1Role in the Prague uprising
6.2Return to Prague
6.3Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans
6.4Communist coup of 1948
7Death
8Legacy
9In fiction
10See also
11References
12Sources
12.1Primary sources
13External links
Early life
Birth and family
Eduard Beneš was born into a peasant family in 1884 in the small town of Kožlany, Bohemia, in what was then the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He was the youngest son and tenth child overall of Matěj Beneš (1843–1910) and Anna Petronila (née Beneš;[2] 1840–1909).[3][4] One of his siblings was the future Czechoslovak politician Vojta Beneš. His nephew through his brother Václav was Bohuš Beneš, a diplomat and author. Bohuš was the father of Emilie Benes Brzezinski, an American sculptor, and Václav E. Beneš, a Czech-American mathematician.[5]
Education and marriage
Edvard Beneš with his wife Hana, seen here in 1934.
Beneš spent much of his youth in the Vinohrady district of Prague, where he attended a grammar school from 1896 to 1904, his landlords family being acquainted with his future wife Anna Vlčková (1885–1974) (cs). The two would later study French, history, and literature together at the Sorbonne. Edvard and Anna got engaged in May 1906, and married in November 1909. Some time after their engagement, Anna changed her name to Hana, which was the name Edvard had called her by since he met her (because he had just ended a relationship with another woman named Anna). Around the same time, Edvard Beneš also changed his name, going from the original spelling "Eduard" to "Edvard".[6][7]
He played soccer as an amateur for Slavia Prague.[8] After studying philosophy at Charles-Ferdinand University in Prague, Beneš left for Paris and continued his studies at the Sorbonne and at the Independent School of Political and Social Studies. He completed his first degree in Dijon, where he received his doctorate of law in 1908. Beneš then taught for three years at a business college, and after his 1912 habilitation in philosophy, Beneš became a lecturer of sociology at Charles University. He was also involved in scouting.[9]
In 1907, Beneš published over 200 articles in the Czech social democratic newspaper Právo Lidu (cs) containing his impressions of life in Western Europe.[10] Beneš wrote he found the German "empire of force and power" repulsive after visiting Berlin, and from London he wrote that "The situation here is terrible and so is life".[10] During World War II, when Beneš was living in exile in London, the German Propaganda Ministry gleefully republished his articles from 1907 expressing mostly negative sentiments about life in Britain.[10] Paris, the "city of light", was, however, a city that Beneš loved, as he wrote that he found it to be "almost miraculously...a magnificent synthesis of modern civilization, of which France is the bearer".[10] For the rest of his life, Beneš was a passionate Francophile and he always stated that Paris was his favorite city.[11]
Political career before independence
During World War I, Beneš was one of the leading organizers of an independent Czechoslovakia from abroad. He organized a pro-independence and anti-Austrian secret resistance movement, Maffia. In September 1915, he went into exile in Paris, where he made intricate diplomatic efforts to gain recognition from France and the United Kingdom for Czechoslovak independence. From 1916 to 1918, he was a Secretary of the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris and Minister of the Interior and of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Czechoslovak government.
In May 1917, Beneš, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk and Milan Rastislav Štefánik were reported to be organizing a "Czechoslovak Legion" to fight for the Western Allies in France and Italy, recruited from among Czechs and Slovaks who were able to get to the front and also from the large emigrant populations in the United States, which was said to number more than 1,500,000.[12] The force grew into one of tens of thousands and took part in several battles, including the Battles of Zborov and Bakhmach in Russia.[13]
Foreign minister
From 1918 to 1935, Beneš was the first and longest-serving Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia. On 31 October 1918, Karel Kramář reported from Geneva to Prague: "If you saw our Dr. Beneš and his mastery of global questions...you would take off your hat and say it was truly marvelous!"[14] His international stature was such that he held the post through 10 successive governments, one of which that he headed himself from 1921 to 1922. In 1919, his decision to pull demoralized Czechoslovak Legions out of the Russian Civil War was denounced by Kramář as a betrayal.[15] He represented Czechoslovakia at the 1919 peace conference in Paris, which led to the Versailles Treaty.
A committed Czechoslovakist, Beneš did not consider Czechs and Slovaks to be separate ethnicities. He served in the National Assembly from 1920 to 1925 and again from 1929 to 1935, representing the Czechoslovak National Social Party (called the Czechoslovak Social Party until 1925). He briefly returned to the academic world as a professor, in 1921. After Jan Černýs first stint as prime minister, Beneš formed a government (cs) for a little over a year from 1921 to 1922.
In the early 1920s, Beneš and his mentor President Masaryk viewed Kramář as the principal threat to Czechoslovak democracy, seeing him as a "reactionary" Czech chauvinist who was opposed to their plans for Czechoslovakia as a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic state.[15] Masaryk and Beneš were openly doubtful of Kramářs commitment to "Western values" that they were committed to such as democracy, enlightenment, rationality and tolerance, seeing him as a romantic Pan-Slavist who looked towards the east rather than the west for ideas.[15]
Kramář very much resented the way in which Masaryk openly groomed Beneš as his successor, noting that Masaryk put articles into the Constitution that set 45 as the age limit for senators, but 35 as the age limit for the presidency, which conveniently made Beneš eligible for the presidency.[15] The charge of Czech chauvinism against Kramář had some substance as he openly proclaimed his belief that the Czechs should be the dominant people in Czechoslovakia, denounced Masaryk and Beneš for their belief that the Sudeten Germans should be equal to the Czechs, and made clear his opposition to having German as one of the official languages of Czechoslovakia, views that made him abhorrent to Beneš.[16]
Between 1923 and 1927, Beneš was a member of the League of Nations Council, serving as president of its committee from 1927 to 1928. He was a renowned and influential figure at international conferences, such as those at Genoa in 1922, Locarno in 1925, The Hague in 1930 and Lausanne in 1932.
First presidency
President Beneš visiting a police station in Brno, 1938.
When President Tomáš Masaryk retired in 1935, Beneš succeeded him. Under Masaryk, the Hrad ("the castle", as the Czechs called the presidency) had built up into a major extra-constitutional institution enjoying considerably more informal power than the plain language of the Constitution indicated.[17] The framers of the Constitution had intended to create a parliamentary system in which the Prime Minister would be the countrys leading political figure. However, due to a complex system of proportional representation, no party even approached the 151 seats needed for a majority; as mentioned above, there were ten cabinets during Masaryks presidency.
The Czech historian Igor Lukeš (cs) wrote about the power of the Hrad under Beneš: "By the spring of 1938, the Czechoslovak parliament, the prime minister, and the cabinet had been pushed aside by Beneš. During the dramatic summer months he was – for better or worse – the sole decision-maker in the country".[17]
Sudeten Crisis
Main article: Munich Agreement
Edvard Beneš opposed Nazi Germanys claim to the German-speaking Sudetenland in 1938. The crisis began on 24 April 1938 when Konrad Henlein at the party congress of the Sudeten German Party in Karlsbad (modern Karlovy Vary) announced the 8-point "Karlsbad programme" demanding autonomy for the Sudetenland.[18] Beneš rejected the Karlsbad programme, but in May 1938 offered the "Third Plan" which would have created 20 cantons in the Sudetenland with substantial autonomy, which in turn was rejected by Henlein.[19] Beneš was keen to go to war with Germany provided that one or more of the Great Powers fought alongside Czechoslovakia, but was unwilling to fight Germany alone.[20] Sergei Aleksandrovsky, the Soviet minister in Prague, reported to Moscow after talking to Beneš that he was hoping to fight a "war against the whole world" provided the Soviet Union was willing to come in.[20]
In London in May 1938, Beneš came under very intense British pressure to accede to the Karlsbad programme, which he initially refused. The British viewed the Sudetenland crisis as a domestic Czechoslovak crisis with international ramifications whereas Beneš saw the crisis as a matter between Czechoslovakia vs. Germany.
In July 1938, the British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax offered the services of a British mediator Lord Runciman, to resolve the crisis, with the promise that Britain would support Czechoslovakia if Beneš was willing to accept the conclusions of Runcimans findings.[21] Seeing a chance to enlist British support, Beneš accepted the Runciman Mission.[21] The British historian A. J. P. Taylor wrote: "Beneš, whatever his other defects, was an incomparable negotiator; and the talents which had been a match for Lloyd George in 1919, soon took Runcimans measure in 1938...Instead, Runciman found that he was being maneuvered into a position where he had to endorse the Czech offers as reasonable, and to condemn the obstinacy of the Sudetens, not of Beneš. An appalling consequence [for Britain] loomed ever nearer; if Beneš did all that Runciman asked of him, and more, Great Britain would be saddled with the moral obligation to support Czechoslovakia in the ensuring crisis. To avert this consequence, Runciman, far from urging Beneš on, had to preach delay. Beneš did not allow him to escape".[22]
On 4 September 1938, Beneš presented the "Fourth Plan", which, had it happened, would have come very close to turning Czechoslovakia into a federation, and would have given the Sudetenland widespread autonomy. Henlein rejected the Fourth Plan and instead launched a revolt in the Sudetenland, which soon failed. On 12 September 1938, in his keynote speech at the Nuremberg party rally, Adolf Hitler demanded the Sudetenland join Germany. On 30 September 1938, Germany, Italy, France and the United Kingdom signed the Munich Agreement, which allowed for the annexation and military occupation of the Sudetenland by Germany. Czechoslovakia was not consulted. Beneš agreed, despite opposition from within his country, after France and the United Kingdom warned that they would remain neutral, despite their previous promises, in a war between Germany and Czechoslovakia.[23] Beneš was forced to resign on 5 October 1938, under German pressure,[23] and was replaced by Emil Hácha.
In March 1939, German troops marched into what remained of Czechoslovakia, which they declared a protectorate of Nazi Germany and detached Slovakia as a puppet state, thereby completing the German occupation of Czechoslovakia which would last until 1945.
Wartime exile in Britain
See also: German occupation of Czechoslovakia and United Kingdom home front during World War II
Beneš posing with members of the Czechoslovak Air Force, recently returned to the United Kingdom from the Middle East.
On 22 October 1938, Beneš went into exile in Putney, London. Czechoslovakias intelligence service headed by František Moravec was still loyal to Beneš, which gave him a valuable bargaining chip in his dealings with the British as Paul Thümmel, a highly ranking officer of the Abwehr, Germanys military intelligence, was still selling information to Moravecs group.[24] In July 1939, Beneš realising that "information is power", started to share with the British some of the intelligence provided by "Agent A-54" as Thümmel was code-named.[24] As the British lacked any spies in Germany comparable to Agent A-54, the British were intensely interested in the intelligence provided by him, which Beneš used to bargain with in dealings with the British.[24]
By July 1939, the Danzig crisis had pushed Britain to the brink of war with Germany, and British decision-makers were keenly interested in any high-level intelligence about Germany.[24] In the summer of 1939, Beneš hoped that the Danzig crisis would end in war, seeing a war with Germany as his only hope of restoring Czechoslovakia.[24] At the same time, Beneš started to have regular lunches with Winston Churchill, at the time only a backbench Conservative MP, and Harold Nicolson, a backbencher National Labour MP who was likewise opposed to the Munich Agreement.[24] Besides his new British friends like Churchill and Nicolson, Beneš also resumed contact with old British friends from World War I such as the historian Robert Seton-Watson and the journalist Henry Wickham Steed, who wrote articles urging the restoration of Czechoslovakia to its pre-Munich Agreement borders.[24]
On 23 August 1939, Beneš met Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador to the Court of St. James, to ask for Soviet support. According to Maiskys diary, Beneš told him that he wanted a common frontier between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.[25] Furthermore, Maiskys diary had Beneš saying that if Czechoslovakia were restored, he would cede Ruthenia, whose people Beneš noted were mostly Ukrainian, to the Soviet Union to bring about a common frontier.[25]
On the same day, Beneš learned of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. When he confronted Maisky, he was told that war would break out "in two weeks time", causing Beneš to write: "My overall impression is that the Soviets want war, they have prepared for it conscientiously and they maintain that the war will take place – and that they have reserved some freedom of action for themselves... [The pact was] a rather rough tactic to drive Hitler into war... the Soviets are convinced that the time has come for a final struggle between capitalism, fascism and Nazism and that there will be a world revolution, which they will trigger at an opportune moment when others are exhausted by war ".[26] Maisky would be proven right on 1 September, when Germany invaded Poland, and the British and French both declared war on Germany two days later.
Organizing the government-in-exile
Main article: Czechoslovak government-in-exile
In October 1939, Beneš organised the Czechoslovak National Liberation Committee, which immediately declared itself the Provisional Government of Czechoslovakia. Britain and France withheld full recognition, though unofficial contacts were permitted.[27] A major issue in wartime Anglo-Czechoslovak relations was the Munich Agreement, which the British still stood by, and which Beneš wanted the British to abrogate.[28] The issue was important because as long the British continued to view the Munich Agreement as being in effect, they recognized the Sudetenland as part of Germany, a British war aim that Beneš naturally objected to. A problem for Beneš during the Phoney War in the winter of 1939–40 was the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain attached much hope to the idea that anti-Nazi conservatives in Germany would persuade the Wehrmacht to overthrow Hitler, and as the anti-Nazi conservatives were adamant that the Sudetenland remain part of Germany, Chamberlain made it clear that Britain was not at war to undo the Munich Agreement.[29]
On 22 February 1940 during a secret meeting in Switzerland between Ulrich von Hassell representing the German conservatives and James Lonsdale-Bryans representing Great Britain, the former told the latter there was no possibility of a post-Nazi Germany ever agreeing to return the Sudetenland.[30] In 1939 and 1940, Chamberlain repeatedly made public statements that Britain was willing to make an "honorable peace" with a post-Nazi Germany, which meant the Sudetenland would remain within the Reich.[29] Beneš with his insistence on restoring Czechoslovakia to its pre-Munich borders was seen by Chamberlain as an obstacle that was standing in the way of his hope that the Wehrmacht would depose Hitler.
After the Dunkirk evacuation, Britain was faced with a German invasion while the British Army had lost most of its equipment, which it had to abandon at Dunkirk. At the same time, 500 Czechoslovak airmen had arrived in Britain together with half of a division, which Beneš called his "last and most impressive argument" for diplomatic recognition.[27] On 21 July 1940, the United Kingdom recognised the National Liberation Committee as being the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, with Jan Šrámek as prime minister and Beneš as president.[27] In reclaiming the presidency, Beneš took the line that his 1938 resignation had been under duress and so was void.
The intelligence provided by Agent A-54 was greatly valued by MI6, the British intelligence service, and Beneš used it to improve his bargaining position, telling the British he would share more intelligence from Agent A-54 in return for concessions to his government-in-exile.[31] As part of his efforts to improve his bargaining position, Beneš often exaggerated to the British the efficiency of Moravecs group, the Czechoslovak army in exile and the underground UVOD resistance group.[31] Besides Agent A-54, the Prime Minister of the Czech government under the Protectorate, General Alois Eliáš, was in contact with Moravecs agents. Benešs efforts paid off as he was invited to lunch, first at 10 Downing Street by Churchill (who was now Prime Minister), and then by King George VI at Buckingham Palace.[31]
In September 1940, MI6 set up a communications center in Surrey for Czechoslovak intelligence and in October 1940 a Victorian mansion at Leamington Spa was given to the Czechoslovak brigade under General Miroslav.[31] At the same time, Moravecs group began to work with the Special Operations Executive (SOE) to plan resistance in the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, through the distance between Britain and the Protectorate made it difficult for the SOE to parachute in agents.[31]
In November 1940, in the wake of the London Blitz, Beneš, his wife, their nieces and his household staff moved to The Abbey at Aston Abbotts, near Aylesbury in Buckinghamshire. The staff of his private office, including his secretary, Eduard Táborský (cs), and his chief of staff, Jaromír Smutný (cs), moved to the Old Manor House in the neighbouring village of Wingrave, and his military intelligence staff, headed by František Moravec, was stationed in the nearby village of Addington.
Operation Barbarossa begins
Benešs relations with the Polish government-in-exile headed by General Władysław Sikorski were difficult due to the Teschen dispute, as General Sikorski insisted on claiming the region for Poland, while Beneš argued that it should return to Czechoslovakia when the war was over.[32] However, Beneš felt a Polish-Czechoslovak alliance was needed to counter Germany in the post-war world, and came around to the idea of a Polish-Czechoslovak federation as the best way of squaring the circle caused by the Teschen dispute.[32] In November 1940, Beneš and Sikorski signed an agreement in principle calling for federation, through Benešs insistence that the Slovaks were not a nation and Slovakia would not be a full member of the federation caused much tension between himself and Slovak members of the government-in-exile.[32]
However, after Operation Barbarossa brought the Soviet Union into the war in June 1941, Beneš started to lose interest in the project, through a detailed agreement for the proposed federation was worked out and signed in January 1942.[32] The Russophile Beneš always felt more comfortable with dealing with Russians rather than the Poles, whose behavior in September 1938 was a source of much resentment to Beneš.[32] The promise from the Narkomindel that the Soviet Union supported returning Teschen to Czechoslovakia negated the whole purpose of the proposed federation for Beneš.[32]
On 22 June 1941, Germany launched Operation Barbarossa and invaded the Soviet Union. President Emil Hacha of the puppet government serving under the Protectorate praised Hitler in a statement for launching the "crusade against Bolshevism" and urged Czech workers to work even harder for a German victory, observing that much of the material used by the Wehrmacht was manufactured in the Protectorate.[33] Through Moravec, Beneš sent word to both General Eliáš and Hacha that they should resign rather than give comfort to the enemy, stating his belief that the Soviet Union would inevitably defeat Germany and thus would have a decisive role in the affairs of Eastern Europe after the war.[33] Moreover, Beneš charged that if the most of the resistance work in the Protectorate were done by the Czech communists that would give them "a pretext to take over power on the basis of the justified reproach that we helped Hitler".[33]
During the war Beneš told Ehrenburg, the Soviet writer: “The only salvation lies in a close alliance with your country. The Czechs may have different political opinions, but on one point we can be sure. The Soviet Union will not only liberate us from the Germans. It will also allow us to live without constant fear of the future.”[34][35]
On 18 July 1941, the Soviet Union recognized Benešs government-in-exile, promised non-interference in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia, allowed the government-in-exile to raise an army to fight alongside the Red Army on the Eastern Front; and recognized the borders of Czechoslovakia as those before the Munich Agreement.[33] The last was the most important to Beneš, as the British government still maintained that the Munich Agreement was in effect and regarded the Sudetenland as part of Germany.[33] Even the United States (which was neutral) very tentatively regarded the government-in-exile as only a "provisional" government and rather vaguely stated the borders of Czechoslovakia were to be determined after the war, implying the Sudetenland might remain part of Germany.[33]
Working with the Czech resistance
See also: Resistance in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and Operation Anthropoid
During the summer and fall of 1941, Beneš came under increasing pressure from the Allies to have the Czechs play a greater role in resistance work.[36] The Narkomindel informed Beneš that the Soviets were disappointed that there was so little sabotage going on in the factories of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, which were such an important source of arms and other material for the Wehrmacht.[36] Likewise, the British started to demand that the Czechs do more resistance work.[36] Moravec after meeting the MI6s Director, Stewart Menzies, told Beneš that the British viewpoint was that when the United Kingdom was fighting for its life that "placing violets at the grave of the unknown soldier was simply not good enough".[36]
Making matters worse for Beneš was in late September 1941 that Reinhard Heydrich, who effectively taken over the Protectorate, launched a major crackdown on resistance.[37] The Prime Minister, General Eliáš, was arrested on 27 September 1941 on Heydrichs orders; martial law was proclaimed in the Protectorate; thousands were arrested and executed including two prominent leaders of the UVOD resistance group, Josef Bílý (cs) and Hugo Vojta (cs) who were arrested and shot without trial.[37]
On 5 October 1941, the lines of communication between the UVOD group and London were severed when the Gestapo, during the course of its raids, seized various radios and the codes for communicating with London.[37] At the same time, the Gestapo also learned of the existence of Agent A-54 and after an investigation arrested Thümmel, depriving Beneš of one of his most valuable bargaining chips.[37] Faced with this situation when the Allies were demanding more Czech resistance at the same time that Heydrich had launching a crackdown that was weakening the resistance, Beneš decided in October 1941 on a spectacular act of resistance that would prove to the world that the Czechs were still resisting.[38]
Edvard Beneš (right) gives medals to soldiers, including the later Operation Anthropoid assassins Jozef Gabčík and Jan Kubiš, 1940.
In 1941, Beneš and František Moravec planned Operation Anthropoid to assassinate Reinhard Heydrich,[39] a high-ranking German official who was responsible for suppressing Czech culture, and for deporting and executing members of the Czech resistance. Beneš felt his dealings with the Allies, especially his campaign to persuade the British to nullify the Munich Agreement, was being weakened by the lack of any visible resistance in the Protectorate.[40] Beneš decided that assassinating Heydrich was the best way to improve his bargaining position, and it was largely he who pressed for Operation Anthropoid.[41]
Upon learning of the nature of the mission, resistance leaders begged the Czechoslovak government-in-exile to call off the attack, saying that "An attempt against Heydrichs life... would be of no use to the Allies and its consequences for our people would be immeasurable."[42] Beneš personally broadcast a message insisting that the attack go forwards,[42] although he denied any involvement after the war.[43] Historian Vojtěch Mastný argues that he "clung to the scheme as the last resort to dramatize Czech resistance."[43] The 1942 assassination resulted in brutal German reprisals such as the execution of thousands of Czechs and the eradication of two villages: Lidice and Ležáky.
Britain rejects the Munich Agreement
In 1942, Beneš finally persuaded the Foreign Office to issue a statement saying Britain had revoked the Munich Agreement and supported the return of the Sudetenland to Czechoslovakia.[28] Beneš saw the statement by the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, to the House of Commons on 5 August 1942 revoking the Munich Agreement as a diplomatic triumph for himself.[27] Beneš had been greatly embittered by the behavior of the ethnic Germans of the Sudetenland in 1938, which he viewed as treasonous, and during his exile in London had decided that when Czechoslovakia was reestablished, he was going to expel all of the Sudeten Germans into Germany.[28] During his exile, Beneš had come to obsessively brood over the behavior of the Sudetenlanders and had reached the conclusion that they were all collectively guilty of treason.[32] In 1942, he stated the compulsory population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1922–23 was his model for solving the problem of the Sudetenland, though unlike the Greek-Turkish population exchange, he proposed financial compensation to be paid to the Sudeten Germans expelled into Germany.[44]
Although not a Communist, Beneš was also on friendly terms with Joseph Stali.
Boutiques Photo de presse Président Edvard Beneš Tchécoslovaquie vintage originale rare
